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1.  Introduction 
Social security, the pension system is a part of, plays an important role all over the 
world. The role is focused on social goals. Societies deeply internalised existence of 
pension systems. They internalised not only the goals but also the design of these 
systems. To some extent applying particular methods became perceived as identical 
with goals themselves. 
In majority of countries pension systems were established long time ago, typically in 
the first half of the twenties century. Design of systems was developed in a way that 
suited social, economic and demographic characteristics of situation typical that time. 
These characteristics have dramatically changed. Traditional design of pension 
systems ceased to fit demographic structure of population. However, for a long time 
the demographic change was not reflected in any adjustments within social security. 
Other way around, the traditional design of the pension system – even being 
inefficient – turned into a firm part of institutional structure in majority of countries 
all over the world. Social policy experts, politicians and the general public as well 
internalised the assumption that giving up the methods meant giving up social goals. 
In consequence, endless arguing on social-economic trade-off dominated activity 
within the area of pensions instead of discussing how pension systems can become 
efficient again. New Polish Pension System 
 
2
For a number of years the inefficient pension systems were maintained without major 
problems since it was relatively easy to hide effects of systems’ inefficiency. Pension 
system debt arising due to running the inefficient systems used to be neglected by 
financial markets even when it reached levels exceeding the scale of countries’ GDP.
1 
Nowadays economic growth is slowed down and unemployment pressure is increased 
due to large tax wedges caused by ever increasing costs of maintaining traditional 
pension systems. Financial markets do perceive the pension debt especially if it 
cannot be serviced without subsidisation financed from general revenues. Ignoring the 
pension debt proofed to be no longer possible. This triggered the need of a pension 
reform. 
The Polish pension system is an interesting example of recent tendencies in thinking 
on social security. Until late 1990s the situation in Poland was qualitatively similar to 
the situation typical for continental European countries, quantitatively it was much 
worse since the Polish pension system belonged to the most expensive ones in 
Europe.
2  Moreover projections clearly show that if the old system had not been 
terminated it would have reached the level of costs substantially exceeding ability of 
the society to cover them (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Old pension system In Poland (closing situation and hypothetical projection) 
 1998  2050 
Old-age expenditure 
(percent of GDP) 
5,75% 11,42% 
Contribution rate needed to 
cover expenditure 
(percent of the wage base) 
24% 48% 
Current deficit (old-age 
pensions only) 
(percent of GDP) 
0,98% 5,50% 
                                                 
1  Pension (social security) debts reached very high level in majority of OECD countries. See 
Roseveare et al. (1996). 
2 See Dang at al. (2001). Data on pension expenditure are also presented in Table […] later in this 




(percent of GDP) 
12,79% 17,32% 
Current deficit (all 
pensions) 
(percent of GDP) 
2,18% 7,47% 
Source: Chłoń-Domińczak (2002). 
 
The strong increase of costs is line with previous tendency that has been observed for 
the last 25 years. In order to balance pension system’s revenues and expenditure the 
contribution rate had to be constantly increased over that period (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Social security contributions increases over the recent 25 years 






15.5  25 33 43 38 43 45 
 
Developments presented in Table 2 have created devastating effects in the labour 
market. The increase of the contribution rate caused corresponding increase of labour 
costs and consequently high unemployment pressure. For the entire period since 1990 
the unemployment rate in Poland substantially exceeded 10 percent. 
 
2.  The quest for pension reform 
Since 1 January a new pension system has been in place in Poland. It substituted the 
previous system, which - although still viable to pay the due pensions for some time 
to come, from actuarial point of view was bankrupt. The introduction of the new 
system stopped the process of drawing liabilities by the system, which it would be 
unable to pay back thus putting the fate of pensioners at risk. Interruption of the 
operations of the old system was due to its doubtless inefficiency. New Polish Pension System 
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The problem which necessitated substitution of the old system was neither 
specifically Polish nor related to the economic transformation. On the contrary, this is 
a global problem which ensues mainly from a significant change in the demographic 
structure of the majority of societies. Traditional pension systems appeared to be 
incompatible with the new reality. What used to be an excellent solution - by this I 
mean the Bismarck system - became a burden to societies. 
Disposing of the ballast and thus saving the pension system is not an easy task. In 
cases of many states - this refers mainly to the richest, European states - initiation of 
the forming of a new pension system is constantly postponed and the inefficient 
system is subsidised on a large scale. Instead of solving the problem this solely delays 
its adverse consequences. Less affluent countries facing the increasing inefficiency of 
their pension systems undertake attempts at their rationalisation. That is actually 
equivalent to cuts in expenditure and seeking new sources of income. The latter 
usually consists in straightforward raising the contributions. Until quite recently 
Poland used to be an exemplary field of such - otherwise necessary - operations. The 
problem is that no rationalisation of the system can remove the sources of its 
inefficiency and it only postpones the “moment of truth” when the Treasury turns out 
to be empty. 
Formal state guarantees - which usually back-up traditional pension systems - are of 
no avail than. This is so because security of the pension system and its participant in 
the long-term ensues solely from the fact that the system is able to generate the 
moneys to pay out due pensions. State guarantees can only be limited to raising taxes 
or contributions (which - nota bene - in traditional systems are just a kind of taxes). In 
other words it means that if “we pay ourselves more, than we will have more” - which 
is quite a perverse mechanism. 
Due to the disjunction of the relationship between contributions and benefits, the 
traditional pension systems seem to be attractive means of solving various social 
problems. Certainly this is done with the detriment to the main goal of the functioning 
of the pension system which is to provide a source of income to people at the old age. 
Much can be promised within such a system without a single thought given to 
whether such promises can be kept at all and if yes - then at what cost. Such actions 
are possible because there can be even a several-decade gap between the moment New Polish Pension System 
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when the promise is made and the moment when the costs of such a promise are to be 
paid. This is a dream area for manipulation and irresponsible social policy. 
Therefore the old pension system needed to be substituted with a new one. This had to 
be done as fast as possible because every single year of delay increased the social 
costs of the operation. Awareness of this fact was common in Poland since early 
1990ties. The remaining question was how to construct the new system and how to 
implement it. Answers to both questions were formulated in the programme “Security 
through diversity”. 
The basis guidelines of the currently introduced pension reform “Security through 
diversity” have been much praised by international organisations including OECD, 
the World Bank and ILO. The only massively criticised element of the new pension 
system is that the original idea of the of the reform fathers, postulating equal 
minimum retirement age for both men and women at 62 was not implemented. The 
diversified retirement age: 65 for men and 60 for women was introduced instead. 
Subsequent parts of the text will be devoted to a concise description of the new 
pension system and presentation of main premises for such construction of the system. 
 
3.  Three important theoretical issues
3 
In this paper I focus only on three important theoretical issues that are essential for the 
new Polish system design leaving aside a number of other issues discussed in pension 
economics. The issues relevant for the presentation of the Polish old-age system are: 
¾  Proportion of GDP shared by the working generation with the retired 
generation; 
¾  Social goal of the old-age pension system; 
¾  Saving/insurance nature of a modern pension system versus tax nature of the 
traditional pension system. 
 
                                                 
3 The theoretical discussion as well as the form of presentation of the new Polish pension system 
follows much broader material presented in Góra (2003). New Polish Pension System 
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Sharing GDP between generations 
Pension systems can be organised in various ways but in all cases they lead to a 
division of GDP between the working generation and the retired generation. The 
larger share of GDP is allocated to the retired generation the smaller share of GDP is 
left for the working generation. Consequently remuneration of production factors is 
also reduced which slows down economic growth. The decision on how large the 
share of GDP allocated to the retired generation (GDP
R) should be is subject to public 
choice. However, demographic trends cause that this part is growing. Weak growth 
observed in many countries all over the world, among them in some really affluent 
countries, can be partially explained by the sharp increase of  GDP
GDP
R  ratio. 
Traditional pension systems are designed along the promise of delivering to an 
individual retiree a certain share of GDP ( const
L
GDP
R = ). Given demographic trends, 
the promise cannot be fulfilled unless remuneration of production factors is reduced. 
Even if this can be achieved pensions are lover in real terms since the GDP being 
shared between the generations will be smaller. 
The inefficiency built in into the traditional system can be avoided if the pension 
promise is define in terms of the entire retired generation ( GDP
GDP
R
= const.). In this 
situation individual share per retiree can be smaller but pensions will be larger in real 
terms since the GDP to be shared will be larger. 
Social goal of the system 
The general change of the demographic structure around the world has caused severe 
fiscal problems for many countries. This change can be seen also from the viewpoint 
of being able to achieve the traditional social goals of the pension system. In this 
regard, two important observations are worth mentioning: 
¾ In the past, the minority – nowadays the vast majority – of those who pay 
contributions to the system as workers, afterwards receive benefits as retirees. This 
means that in the active phase of the individual’s life, participation in the pension 
system is very similar to long term saving. As the goal is to provide for each 
individual, using the individual as the main accounting unit becomes a superior 
way to organize the pension system. New Polish Pension System 
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¾ In the past, the pension system channelled GDP
R to the very old people who were 
unable to earn a living and finance consumption on their own. Nowadays people 
who retire are still able to work and earn, and they – on average have many years 
of life left to live. 
Savings/insurance versus taxation 
Traditional pension systems are financed through taxation of the working generation. 
This contributes to tax wedges and cause tax distortions that slow down economic 
growth. The same share of GDP can be allocated to the retirees if the working 
generation saves for their own future pensions buying assets accumulated by the 
retired generation. This latter method of sharing GDP with the retirees reaches social 
goal of the pension system being at the same time much more efficient. 
 
4.  Design of the new Polish pension system 
Polish pension reform “Security through diversity” is the original project developed 
by the team working on the basis of the Office of the Plenipotentiary for the Social 
Security Reform. The new pension system was designed with due consideration given 
to Poland’s need and capacity, and to all available world experience in the area of 
functioning and financing of pension systems. Those which proved most useful in the 
process of developing the Polish pension system are presented below. 
Construction of the entirety of the new pension system takes advantage of experiences 
of many other countries which recently undertook the difficult task of reforming their 
pension systems. The Polish system is largely similar to the new pension system 
introduced on 1 January 1999 in Sweden. This refers particularly to the fundamental 
principle of the whole pension system of close relationship between the contribution 
and pension. 
Although the Polish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design 
differs from the typical approaches. This section of the paper focuses on presentation 
of the new Polish system focusing on highlighting these elements of its design that are 
specific. At the same time less focus is put on technical issues that are more typical 
for pension systems elsewhere. 
 New Polish Pension System 
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4.1. Basic principles of the new system 
The new system principles can be summarised as follows. 
¾  Focusing on the mandatory part of the pension system; 
¾  Separation of the old-age part of social security (OA) from the non-old-age part of 
social security (NOA); 
¾  Termination of the OA part of the previous system; 
¾  Creation of a new OA pension system, entirely based on individual accounts; 
¾  Splitting each person’s OA contributions between two accounts (first account – 
NDC, second account – FDC, see below); 
¾  Annuitisation of account values (NDC as well as FDC) at the moment of 
retirement; 
¾  Minimum pension supplement on the top of both annuities if their sum is below 
certain level (paid out of the state budget). 
NDC (non-financial defined contribution) – individual accounts based on quasi-bonds 
(gov.) not traded in financial markets, bringing rate of return equal wage sum growth 
(GDP growth in long run).
4 
FDC (financial defined contribution) – individual accounts based on instruments 
traded in financial markets.
5 
Both accounts are annuitised at the same moment and play exactly the same role 
within social security. 
Retirement age does not play any active role in balancing the new system. Retirement 
age is still important from the point of view of social policy and labour supply. For 
these reasons in the new system minimum retirement age is set at 60 for women and 
65for men.
6 The system itself can be run at any retirement age. 
 
                                                 
4 There is a tax on yields (25%). 
5 There is no tax on yields at the moment. 
6 Initial reform project set retirement age at 62 for both genders. For political reasons this was not 
accepted. Hopefully this will be possible in the future but up to now no decision has been taken. New Polish Pension System 
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4.2. Individual accounts (both NDC and FDC) 
The new system is based on the same contribution inflow as the previous one. The 
main change is changing the way in which retirement obligations are defined. 
 
Table 3. Mandatory contributions in Poland before and after implementation 
of the new pension system 









a  -- --  36.59 
since 1-Jan-1999 
Mandatory old-age 
contribution  19.52 12.22  7.3  -- 
Other mandatory 
contributions  17.07  -- --  17.07 
a Equivalent of 45 percent (after grossing-up). 
From the individual perspective, the new system is a method of life cycle income 
allocation. 
¾  Contributions based on a fixed percent of individual earnings create account 
values. 
¾  Account balances from the close of the preceding period earn a rate of return 
based on the growth of the sum of paid contributions. 
¾  Accumulated account values are annuitised at the time of retirement 
¾  Annuities are calculated on the basis of accumulated capital and life expectancy at 
the age of retirement. 
¾  Technical (demographic) reserves are created. New Polish Pension System 
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From macroeconomic perspective the system is a method of sharing GDP between 
generations. The key feature of this system is stabilisation of the share being 
transferred to the entire retired generation. 
 
4.3. Phasing-in 
Starting from 1 January 1999 the entirely new system replaced the old one for all 
people born after 31 December 1948. Participation in the new system was not subject 
to individual choice. The new system automatically covered the entire group of people 
born after that date. There was no switching. However, a group of participants took 
decisions on choosing one of two versions of the new system. Decisions were taken in 
the period until 31 December 1999. Table 4 provides summary of the procedure. 
 
Table 4. Introduction of the new system (age groups) 
New system (people born after 31 Dec. 1948) 
People born 
after 31 Dec. 1968 
People born 
before 1 Jan. 1969 
Old system (people born 
before 1 Jan. 1949) 
Automatically covered by 
the new system; OA 
contribution automatically 
split between two accounts 
[NDC+FDC] 
Automatically covered by 
the new system; OA 
contribution either split 
between two accounts or 
paid into one account 
[(NDC+FDC) or NDC] 
Stay in the old system (no 




Offering people the opportunity to take decisions is usually well received. However, 
the idea of universal system means not only universal coverage but also universal 
rules. Choice is an illusion in a mandatory system, which can impose problems. 
Choice is appropriate for voluntary partial programmes. 
There were two major exceptions from the procedure presented in Table 4. 
Agricultural workers kept being covered by a special pension scheme. The so-called 
uniform services (army, police) were covered by the new universal system but that 
concerned only those who started their servicing after 31 December 1998, while the 
rest of this group stayed in their special pension scheme. New Polish Pension System 
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4.4. The Polish system and other approaches 
Comparative analysis of pension systems goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is, 
however, very informative to present a couple of features of the Polish system 
“Security through Diversity” as compared to typical three pillar pension system 
design. There are a lot of similarities between the two. Similar are ideas behind them; 
similar are also technical approaches used in particular parts of them. However, the 
Polish system can hardly be called a typical three pillar system since in fact there is no 
element of this system that can be attributed to the term first pillar. Table 5 provide 
some useful hints on what is the essence of the specific design of the Polish system 
compared to the three pillars. 
 
Table 5. Alternative approaches to pension reform 
Typical “three pillar” reform Security  through  Diversity 
¾ Rationalised old system (redistribution; 
anonymous participation) „first pillar”
¾ New part of the system based on 
financial individual accounts run by 
private asset managers „second pillar” 
¾ Contribution split between the old and 
the new system 
¾ Promotion of various forms of 
additional savings „third pillar” 
¾ Splitting social security into OA and 
NOA 
¾ Termination of the OA part of the old 
system 
¾ Creation of entirely new OA part of the 
system (individual accounts of two 
types; annuitisation on retirement; no 
redistribution) 
¾ Contribution split between two 
accounts 
¾ First account – non- financial; rate of 
return determined by GDP growth; 
publicly run (possible privatisation) 
¾ Second account – financial; rate of 
return determined in financial markets; 
privately run 
¾ Annuitisation of account values (both 
accounts) 
¾ Promotion of various forms of 
additional savings 
 
 New Polish Pension System 
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5.  Expected effects of the reform 
Effects of implementation of the new pension system can be are illustrated the best by 
presenting OECD projections of pension expenditure and costs of servicing pension 
debts in member countries. Due to implementation of the new system in Poland OA 
pension expenditure will substantially drop from one of the highest levels now to one 
of the lowest in the OECD area in 2050. Low costs generated by the need to service 
the pension debt will let Poland grow quicker than it would be the case if Poland had 
to cover costs at the level similar to majority of other countries of the region. Table 6 
provides summary of information. 
 
Table 6. Projected effects as compared to other OECD countries 
Dependency ratio  Pension expenditure (%GDP)  Primary surplus required 
(%GDP) 
 
2000  2050 Change 2000  2050 Change  Debt  constant Debt  reduced
Australia  20.4 47.0 26.6  3.0  4.5  1.5  ..  .. 
Austria  25.2  58.2  33.0 9.5 11.8 2.3  ..  .. 
Belgium  28.1  49.5  21.4 8.8 12.1 3.3  4.2  5.3 
Canada  20.4  45.9  25.5 5.1 11.0 5.9  3.7  4.5 
Czech  Republic  21.9 57.5 35.6 7.8 14.6 6.8 1.6  1.8 
Denmark  24.2 40.3 16.1  6.1  8.8  2.7  3.7  4.0 
Finland  25.9  50.6  24.7 8.1 12.9 4.8  2.5  2.1 
France  27.2 50.8 23.6 12.1 15.8  3.7  5.9  6.6 
Germany  26.6 53.2 26.6 11.8 16.9  5.1  4.3  4.7 
Hungary  23.7 47.2 23.5  6.0  7.2  1.2  ..  .. 
Island  20.3 44.0 23.7  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Ireland  19.7 45.7 26.0  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Italy  28.8 66.8 38.0 14.2 13.9 -0.3  4.9  5.9 
Japan  27.7 64.6 36.9  7.9  8.5  0.6  3.6  4.1 
Korea  11.3  45.4  34.1 2.1 10.1 8.0  3.9  3.5 
Netherlands  21.9  44.9  23.0 5.2 10.0 4.8  6.1  6.6 
New  Zealand 20.4  48.3  27.9 4.8 10.6 5.8  2.9  2.9 
Norway  25.6  41.2  15.6 4.9 12.9 8.0  4.6  4.0 
Poland  20.4 55.2 34.8 10.8 8.3 -2.5  -1.0  -1.0 
Portugal  26.7  50.9  24.2 8.0 12.5 4.5  3.4  3.4 
Spain  27.1  65.7  38.6 9.4 17.4 8.0  4.8  5.2 
Sweden  29.4  46.3  16.9 9.2 10.8 1.6  1.0  1.1 
Switzerland  25.1 45.3 20.2  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
UK  26.6 45.3 18.7  4.3  3.6  -0.7  0.8  1.2 
USA  21.7 37.9 16.2  4.4  6.2  1.8  2.7  3.2 
OECD  (avg.) 23.8  49.9  26.1 7.4 10.6 3.2  ..  .. 
Source: OECD. See Dang et al. (2001). 
Notice: If only pension expenditure is taken into account then the required surplus 
needed in the case of Poland is even more favourable (-2.8% GDP). 




Unemployment has reached a very high level in Poland. Many causes for this state of 
affairs are discussed - while fittingly more often immediately proposing various cures, 
they seldom bring up one of the most important factors determining high 
unemployment in Poland. Meanwhile, this old system of social insurance has led this 
phenomenon to grow to such great proportions. This has occurred in the following 
manner. 
The old system was not actuarially balanced, which means that the debt it generated 
rose in an uncontrollable way, at a pace exceeding the pace of growth of the 
contribution base. This necessitated the raising of ZUS contributions. From an 
economic viewpoint, these contributions were simply taxes. In the course of twenty 
years these contribution-taxes rose from a level of 15.5 percent to 45 percent in 1998, 
which was still not enough to cover the costs of the system. This brought about an 
enormous rise in the size of the so called tax wedge, from which arises a substantial 
increase of tax distortions slowing down the growth of the economy, and with it, the 
possibility for job growth. 
The old pension system created the possibility and outright encouraged early 
retirement. From an individual’s point of view, to go on retirement as early as 
possible was fully rational. Hence, people went on retirement at the earliest possible 
moment. They paid contributions for a corresponding shorter period of time, whereas 
received pension payments correspondingly longer. The proceeds to the system fell, 
while simultaneously, the expenses grew, placing an enormous additional burden on 
the pension system (the so-called tax wedge grew). If it were not for this, the 
premiums would be approximately 12 percentage points lower; meaning a few million 
potential jobs.
7 
The old system also encouraged the hiding of income. In many cases, it permitted 
outright an easy, legal way around paying contributions. Making use then of this 
possibility, caused both the contribution base to be lowered and necessitated 
increasing the rate of contributions. This in turn increased further the motivation for 
avoiding paying premiums. The tax wedge grew; payments were made from a lower 
                                                 
7 See Chlon et al. (1999). New Polish Pension System 
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premium base, it was necessary to raise the premium rate, further high unit costs of 
work and unemployment. A precise analysis of the results of this phenomenon is 
difficult to evaluate; however, there are a few million lost jobs in the legal economy. 
All of this taken together puts the old pension system first among the factors behind 
high unemployment in Poland. We remember that, regardless of current fluctuations, 
unemployment has already previously been set at a high level.  The latest 3 - 4 
percentage point rise would be merely unpleasant, in total a small problem, if it had 
stared at a level of 5 – 6 percent, and not as it did from 11 – 12 percent. It is this 11 – 
12 percent that was brought about by the old system. 
The factors discussed here behind such a highly increased level of unemployment are 
not solely specific to Poland. On the contrary, they are typical causes of the generally 
high unemployment of Europe. This results from the fact that the majority of 
European pension systems are in a very bad, often blatantly tragic state. This 
generates enormous costs, the covering up of which increases the size of the tax 
wedge. It is worth mentioning that, even rich countries such as Germany cannot 
further increase the size of the tax wedge. This means equally that they cannot 
indefinitely increase the scale by which they subsidize their pension system, of which 
already 20 percent of its expenses must be hidden under various allocations (part of 
the so called eco-tax, 1 percent of VAT and others). 
The activity undertaken in Poland with the objective of counteracting unemployment 
in the 1990s was not impressive. By the end of this period, however, an unusually 
difficult undertaking was managed: a profoundly rebuilt old-age pension system.  We 
reiterate – the entire old-age pension system, because this is not limited only to the so-
called second pillar. The new old-age system in its entirety is based on individual 
accounts. 
Such a pension system structure causes a reversal of the factors discussed in the 
introduction generating high employment. This happens because: 
a)  The new pension system is actuarially balanced, that is, it does not generate debt 
exceeding that, which it can finance without the necessity of raising contributions 
and/or taxes. In this way, the new pension system tends to improve the long term 
economic growth potential, and, hence, also the growth of jobs. New Polish Pension System 
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b)  In the new pension system, the individual decision of retirement is neutral to the 
system. This eliminates an enormous part of the burden on the pension system. 
Additionally, the elimination of early retirees causes huge savings in the period of 
retirement of the first cohorts covered under the new system. 
c)  Finally, the most important thing. In the new pension system the entire old-age 
pension contribution, that is 19.52 percent ceases having the character of a tax. 
For persons, for which the contribution is paid, it becomes an element of their 
savings. It is significant that the contribution is no longer part of the tax wedge. Its 
value is that it is strongly reduced (almost 20 percent!), and with this comes the 
essential lessening of the effect of the strongest factors generating unemployment. 
The change of the economic character of the old-age pension contribution from tax to 
savings is the main effect of the replacement of the old pension system with the new 
system introduced in 1999. The effect of these changes will be very strong, but its 
manifestation, however, will take some time. At this time, everyone must receive 
regular and accurate statements of their two accounts. 
On the whole, immediate problems are handled more easily and quicker than strategic 
questions. In the case of the Polish labor market, we paradoxically have the opposite 
situation. The long-term question is in a large part resolved. The perspective is good. 
What remains, however, is the immediate challenge of conquering high 
unemployment. 
 
6.  Economic stabilisers of the pension system 
Considerations concerning the problem of pension system stability and self-
sufficiency makes sense solely in the long-term. Good current condition of the 
pension system facilitates its management but in no way does it guarantee to 
contribution payers security of their contributions and thus the security of those 
concerned as pensioners-to-be. 
The new pension system is resilient to many factors which could cause its long-lasting 
deficit. This is quite contrary to the old system, whose susceptibility to development 
of deficit was an indispensable part of its functioning. Resilience of the new system is 
not a declarative feature. On the contrary, it ensues from its very construction. This is 
so because as a matter of principle it does not draw any liabilities towards its New Polish Pension System 
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participants which would not be covered by its future incomes. This is the foundation 
of the security of the pension system. Thus a pensioner-to-be when paying the 
contribution does not run a risk that when they need their money at the old age the 
Treasury will turn out to be empty. If that were the case no guarantee could be of any 
use. The genuine guarantee is the ability of the system to generate the means required 
to pay the liabilities. 
Resilience of the Polish pension system to deficit-generating factors ensues from the 
use of the following stabilisers: 
¾  Individualisation of the participation in the pension system - everybody pay 
contributions into their own accounts, which will finance their pensions. 
¾  Distribution of risk between two pillars of the basic pension system, that is 
between two markets - labour market and capital market. 
¾  Valorisation of the account balance in the first pillar of the pension system is done 
with the use of index related to the pace of wage-fund growth i.e. the total of all 
income in the economy on which contributions are charged. 
¾  Use of actuarially neutral formula for the calculation of pension amount, and in 
particular adoption of the life tables as the main system parameter. This distributes 
the risk among the insured without violating actuarial neutrality. 
¾  Elimination of virtually all capacities for acquisition of pension eligibility without 
payment of adequate contributions. 
¾  The existence of the Demographic Reserve Fund which absorbs the system 
surplus - if one appears - and support payments of due pensions if the current 
system income does not suffice to cover the payments of pensions. 
¾  Existence of the cascade of legal and economic securities in the second, privately 
administered pension funds. Those include in particular: separation of the assets of 
the pension fund from its administrator i.e. a universal pension society; 
introduction of the principle of the minimum rate of return and establishment of 
reserve accounts in each fund and the guarantee fund for the whole of the second 
pillar. 
¾  Elimination of the moral hazard in all system elements. New Polish Pension System 
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Security of persons covered by the new system will ensue from the operations of the 
above-mentioned stabilisers. It must be indicated here, however, that all positive 
results of those stabilisers will appear gradually and simultaneously with the 
disappearance of the old pension system. For persons born in 1949 and later that 
system was closed on 31 December 1998. However it still exists for the elderly people, 
which generates instability of the whole system. The situation will change 
dramatically only when with time majority of pensioners will be receiving their 
benefits from the new system. 
However even now, and at worst starting from the moment when first statements from 
pension accounts under the first and second pillar are received, it will begin to be 
evident that under the new system the contribution is no longer a form of tax, which it 
used to be under the old system. Everybody covered by the new system became 
owners of their contribution in such meaning that it is paid into their individual 
account, multiplied on their behalf and paid to them in the form of the lifetime 
pension after their decision of retirement. 
Such construction of the pension system will counteract any attempts of manipulating 
the system - now it is not any longer the “common pot” but specific money of each of 
us. It will also have several outcomes ensuing from behaviours of system participants 
and influencing the macroeconomic characteristics of the pension system. The most 
significant among them are: an decrease in the so-far strong incentive to conceal the 
genuine income and development of a strong incentive to delay the moment of 
retirement. 
 
7.  Microeconomic characteristics of the new pension system 
The new pension system will also cause beneficial effects at the micro level. This 
effects will make the macro effects discussed above even stronger. The main effects I 
highlight here are reduction of the shadow economy and postponement of retirement 
decisions. 
Declaration of income 
Under the traditional pension system financed with taxes there is a very strong 
motivation to conceal the income on which contribution is paid. Under the old Polish 
system of social security this motivation was particularly strong. When considering New Polish Pension System 
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the reason of the existence of the so-called grey zone one thinks mainly of people 
concealing their genuine income to avoid paying taxes. Such motivation does exist 
but it is not dominating since an average tax rate is equivalent to not more than half of 
the contribution. Hence, if an employee works illegally they do it rather to avoid 
paying the contribution than to avoid paying the income tax. 
In the old system the paid contribution is - from the individual point of view - “lost” 
money. Whether one paid the contribution or not had none or hardly any 
consequences for the pensioner-to-be. That fact was an unambiguous incentive to 
avoid paying contributions. 
In the new system contribution ceases to be a form of tax. Any possible cases of 
avoidance of contribution payment are now of different character; different is also the 
scale of the phenomenon. Its character can be reduced to the difference between the 
individual discount rate the rate of return from the pension system. This difference 
can still have negative value and hence the motivation to conceal income does not 
necessarily disappear in the new system. However, it is certain that the scale of this 
phenomenon is definitely smaller. 
Decreasing the scale of concealing the income will result in an increase of the 
contribution base which - at the fixed contribution rate - will increase the income of 
the system. As a consequence it will make lowering the contribution rate possible. 
System income can be then maintained at the same level at the lower contribution rate. 
The lower contribution rate will result in another decrease in the motivation to conceal 
the income an - what is even more important - in a decrease of labour costs. 
Incentive to delay retirement 
Early retirement is one of the fundamental problems of traditional pension systems. 
Virtually all countries experience this problem. Globally universal financial 
inefficiency of traditional pension systems is largely caused by that phenomenon. 
People work (and thus pay contributions) shorter, but on the other hand they live (and 
receive pensions) longer. As a result smaller funds are available to finance larger 
expenditure. Hence a growing system deficit is unavoidable. 
In Poland average retirement age is much lower than one provided for by the law (60 
for women, 65 for men) at 55 for women and 59 for men. The scale of this 
phenomenon is quite devastating for the social security system. If it were not for this New Polish Pension System 
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fact, the contribution necessary to finance the social security  system could be 12% 
lower than it is currently and would be equal 33% instead of the current 45%. This 
cost is huge and senseless. 
It has been known for long that in Poland - like in most other countries - the actual 
retirement age must increase. However, this is not a simple task. The problem has two 
aspects, which appear in different countries with varying force. On the one hand there 
is the income effect. In rich countries of the European Union people have the 
tendency to choose leisure time instead of extra income. Why work longer if finding 
the time to spend the money is a bigger problem than earning the money. In poorer 
countries one could expect an opposite situation, that is domination of the substitution 
effect. That would prolong the time of professional activities in lifetime. However, 
this is not so. The trend for earlier retirement is universal regardless of the relative 
affluence of societies. This is so because traditional pension systems, still dominating 
the world, flatten pension amounts and longer work either does not at all or very 
slightly increases the amount of received pensions. Therefore delaying retirement 
does not make sense. One works longer, pays contributions and has no time for 
recreation while receiving virtually nothing in exchange. In Poland this effect is 
additionally enhanced by the easiness of receiving pension while keeping to work. In 
other works it is beneficial to retire and continue to work. In this situation pension is 
just an extra income - why not take it? The earlier one has the access to the money 
coming from the “common pot”, the more of it one gets as a result. Such situation is a 
game which individual contribution payers play with the system, i.e. with all 
contribution payers. But nothing is for free. Before we get our hands on the money 
from the common pot, we pay extremely high contributions necessary to finance the 
game played by previous generations. As a result we simply increase the costs of the 
system which we must bear anyway. That obviously does not make any sense. 
However, poorly constructed systems encourage such behaviours. 
The new pension system is constructed quite differently. There are no tax-financed 
pensions and no “common pot”. Everybody gather means for their own pensions on 
their individual accounts (first and second pillar). Participation in the pension system 
– including the decision to retire – is now a transaction we deal with ourselves. Any 
delay in the retirement will result in a significant increase in the amount of pension 
received. According to the formula for calculating the pension, longer work means New Polish Pension System 
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more capital (numerator in the formula) and higher age and hence – on the average – 
shorter period for which the accumulated capital is to suffice (denominator in the 
formula). Thus an increase in the pension value due to a career prolonged by one year 
amounts to 7-10%. The new system – quite contrary to the old one – definitely 
motivates to delay retirement. The whole “profit” of the system ensuing from delayed 
retirement of a system participant is given to that participant. This game one plays 
with themselves does not influence the situation of other system participants. The 
pension system distributes the risk among the insured – however it does not create the 
moral gambling which is so widespread in traditional pension systems. 
On the margin of those considerations one can ask the question: if the system is 
actuarially neutral why set up any minimum retirement age at all? Yes, the system 
could operate without a definite retirement age. Everybody would retire when they 
choose to and get from the system what is due. However the minimum retirement age 
in the new system plays a different role than the statutory retirement age under the old 
system. It is not a parameter which conditions system solvency. System solvency is a 
function of the above-described economic stabilisers. The minimum retirement age in 
the new system is an element of the policy of counteracting poverty. The idea is to 
protect people against too early retirement, when the pension would soon appear 
insufficient to lead a normal life. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
The new pension system introduced in Poland in 1999 is a kind of investment that 
will generate very beneficial long-term effects. It will provide workers with security 
of their participation in the system. The new system will also contribute to reduction 
of unemployment and stronger sustainable economic growth. These will contribute to 
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